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RIGHTS AND THE RELIGION
CLAUSES
FRANK S. RAVITCH*

ABSTRACT
This Essay argues that a fundamental shift in the
conceptualization of rights has taken place under the religion
clauses as a result of the Supreme Court’s move toward formal
neutrality and tradition analysis. This shift has affected the
perception of rights under both the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause. The result is that doctrines and principles that
were once designed, at least in part, to navigate religious pluralism
and protect religious minorities have given way to doctrines and
principles that have the effect of favoring dominant religions and
religious entities. The impact of this shift, which is rarely analyzed as
a discreet concern, will have lasting consequences.

INTRODUCTION

T

he story of rights under the religion clauses of the First
Amendment is dramatic, with unexpected—and often
unexplained—plot twists. Courts in the first half of the twentieth
century set the stage for this interpretive drama.1 The judicial players

Copyright © 2008 by Frank S. Ravitch.
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (reinforcing
separation between church and state as the test under the Establishment Clause and striking
down Champaign, Illinois released-time program, which offered religion classes to students who
chose to take them, while students who opted out of them were required to leave the classroom
and go to another part of the school building); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)
(incorporating the Establishment Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment and declaring
separation of church and state to be the general rule in Establishment Clause cases, while
upholding a Ewing Township, New Jersey law subsidizing bus fares for parochial school
students); Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (upholding rights of Jehovah’s
Witnesses to proselytize and sell goods for religious purposes without being criminally liable for
breach of the peace under state law; decision based heavily on the Free Speech Clause and the
Free Exercise clause); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (requiring
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appeared to be focused on the rights of religious minorities,2 fears of
religious divisiveness,3 a somewhat artificial conception of
individualism,4 and, of course, a strong hint of pragmatism.5
Originalism provided the legal justification for many of these early
6
decisions, but the decisions may have been justifiable on other
grounds as well.7 Unfortunately, the early players in this drama failed
to foresee that by using a highly questionable notion of originalism to
justify an otherwise plausible approach, they would set the stage for
later players to use equally questionable history to undo the
8
substantive protections the early players sought to create.
Without openly changing many lines of doctrine, later courts have
9
completely shifted the emphasis of the early decisions. Through the
use of formalism and traditionalism, the substantive focus has shifted
and is now more protective of dominant religious groups (at least as a
practical matter),10 has little focus on religious divisiveness,11 uses a
exemption from flag salute requirement under school board resolution because of free speech
and free exercise concerns); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating the
Free Exercise Clause and upholding the rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses to proselytize door-todoor under the First Amendment more generally).
2. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04, 406, 409 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 428–29 (1962); McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216–17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Barnette,
319 U.S. at 641.
3. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1971) (discussing religious
divisiveness analysis under the Establishment Clause).
4. See, e.g., FRANK S. RAVITCH, MASTERS OF ILLUSION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
RELIGION CLAUSES 56, 68–69 (N.Y. Univ. Press 2007).
5. Id. at 84–86, 94–95.
6. See generally Everson, 330 U.S. 1 (focusing on the intent of the framers regarding
separation of church and state in both the majority and concurring opinions); Engel, 370 U.S.
421 (arguing that the framers were aware of, and concerned about, government sponsored
prayer based on earlier experience with the Book of Common Prayer and other practices in
England).
7. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 47–105.
8. Id. at 2–6.
9. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (focusing seriously on divisiveness
within entanglement analysis and also recognizing that in appropriate cases purpose and effects
analysis can govern), with Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (ostensibly using the
Lemon framework as modified in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), but excluding analysis
on divisiveness and ultimately shifting focus solely toward issues of facial neutrality and private
choice).
10. See Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1559, 1662 (1989) (“[I]n giving the American civil religion content, the courts run
the risk of favoring traditional and majority religions.”); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing
Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause,
38 GA. L. REV. 489, 498–523 (2004) (asserting that Zelman’s formal neutrality approach has the
practical effect of favoring dominant religious entities in a given geographic area).
11. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662 n.7; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233–34 (rejecting the
“divisiveness based” entanglement under the original Lemon framework).
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somewhat artificial notion of communitarianism,12 and has substituted
its own brand of pragmatism.13 Thus, a new troupe has come along and
altered the backdrop for the story.
When it comes to the story of the Court, rights, and the religion
clauses, it appears that “[a]ll the world’s indeed a stage, [a]nd we are
merely players, [p]erformers and portrayers, [e]ach another’s audience
outside the gilded cage.”14 Those inside the gilded cage, however, have
profoundly changed the substance of the play without changing too
many lines, and as a result, the notion of rights under the religion
clauses has experienced a fundamental shift. If this were only a play,
the gut-wrenching twists and turns would be entertaining and perhaps
thought-provoking. Of course, it is not simply a play, and the rights of
real people and the substantive content of major constitutional
provisions are at stake and have been throughout the drama.
This Essay focuses on the shift over the last twenty-five years from
religion clause doctrine heavily focused on religious divisiveness, and
at least ostensibly, on the rights of those outside dominant religious
traditions in the United States, to one focused on formalism and
traditionalism that ends up inuring to the benefit of the religious
“haves” in society and sometimes diminishes the rights of the
religious “have nots.” Part I will provide a brief overview of the
doctrinal evolution under the religion clauses over the last sixty years
and how this evolution has affected rights concepts under those
clauses. Part II will explore the effect that the increased
implementation of the formal-neutrality doctrine has had on
conceptions of rights under the religion clauses. Part III will explore
the effect of traditionalism on rights under the religion clauses. The
Essay suggests that we have come full circle from the early cases that
seemed concerned with concepts of religious divisiveness and the
protection of religious minorities to a place where the religion clauses
primarily work to the benefit of more dominant religious groups in
our society, even though such results may be driven more by a
misguided formalism than an intent to benefit any religious group or
groups. The focus herein will be on the shifting conception of rights

12. See generally Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion) (relying on
common history, religious heritage, and legal heritage in Texas to uphold display of Ten
Commandments monument on state capitol grounds).
13. RAVITCH, supra note 4.
14. RUSH, Limelight, on MOVING PICTURES (Island/Mercury Records 1981).
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under the religion clauses between the early modern cases and the
current jurisprudence.
I. DOCTRINAL SHIFTS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF RIGHTS
Reading the early Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause
cases, one finds it hard to escape the notion that there was a deep
concern, and sometimes significant debate, over the role of religious
15
pluralism and religious diversity in society. Putting aside for the
moment the legal justifications for these decisions—most often
16
originalism and neutrality —one can see in the early school prayer
17
cases, the early funding cases,18 and the early attempts to deal with
religious expression under the Free Speech Clause, and to a lesser
extent the Free Exercise Clause,19 a pervasive focus on the rights of
religious minorities and nonbelievers, as well as a focus on navigating
20
religious pluralism in an increasingly regulatory state. Given the
apparent need to justify outcomes in these cases, such issues often
played a back seat role to debates over the Framers’ intent and
neutrality under the religion clauses.21 The concerns about navigating
religious pluralism, however, seemed to affect various justices’ notions
of original intent and neutrality.22
I have written elsewhere about the significant problems with the
use of original intent and the concept of neutrality by both the current
and earlier courts.23 Here, the focus will be on the conception of rights

15. See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.
16. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963).
18. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
19. See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
20. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 13.
21. Id. at 2–36.
22. Anti-Catholicism also may have affected some justices’ views of these issues. See
generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (Harvard Univ. Press
2004) (2002) (recounting the evolution of the early separatist movement and the activities of
others such as the anti-Catholic nativists); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828–29 (2000)
(plurality opinion) (noting the abominable, but sadly effective, anti-Catholic influence on the
opposition to funding sectarian schools from the late 1800’s to more recent times). Clearly such
a motivation is wholly inconsistent with concerns regarding religious pluralism and religious
rights more generally. It does not render void, however, the rulings that promote rights for
religious minorities because anti-Catholicism, where it occurred, represented a vitriolic and
unjustifiable exception to this general concern in many of the earlier decisions.
23. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 2–36.
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embodied in religion clause jurisprudence. Concerns about rights are
embodied not just in specific cases but in lines of cases and the
principles used to support those decisions.
One of the first questions is whether it is appropriate to talk about
rights in the Establishment Clause context. Some commentators
argue that the Free Exercise Clause is an individual rights clause,24 but
the Establishment Clause is not because it was created as a
25
mechanism to protect state establishments from federal interference,
or as a structural provision governing the relationship between
26
religion and the federal government (and later, state governments).
These arguments are certainly plausible as a matter of original intent,
but for present purposes, they are beside the point. Significantly, this
Essay focuses on the shifting conception of rights within the religion
clause jurisprudence, and many, if not most, of the cases involve either
an individual assertion of rights or individuals or organizations
bringing claims for a perceived violation of the rights of all citizens.27
This Essay addresses the shift in focus on rights within the
jurisprudence in this area, and for present purposes, we must take that
jurisprudence on its face.
Cases involving religious expression under the Free Speech
Clause, and to a lesser extent the Free Exercise Clause, reflect
concerns about majoritarian dominance over the rights of religious
outsiders. Most notable among these cases is the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v.

24. Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development:
Part I, the Religious Liberty Guarantee, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1389 (1967) (The tension
between the two religion clauses “requires a value judgment as to which one is to become
dominant when there is a conflict—the one premised on a vital civil right, or the one premised
on an outmoded eighteenth century political theory”).
25. Id.
26. Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Governmental
Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1998).
27. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (involving a civil
liberties group that brought suit claiming violation of the Establishment Clause based on
courthouse displays of the Ten Commandments); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S.
290 (2000) (involving families that brought suit to end several practices that allegedly violated
the Establishment Clause; the ultimate issue to come before the Court concerned prayer at
football games); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(involving Native American church members who brought suit based on Free Exercise Clause
after they were denied unemployment benefits because of their ritual use of peyote); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (involving a Seventh Day Adventist who brought suit under the
Free Exercise Clause after being denied unemployment benefits because the plaintiff was a
Saturday Sabbatarian and, thus, could not work on Saturdays).
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Barnette.28 In a famous passage from that opinion, Justice Jackson
wrote:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One’s right to
life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press, freedom of
worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be
29
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.

The ideals expressed in this passage from Barnette were reflected
in numerous decisions under the Establishment and Free Exercise
clauses from the 1940’s to the early 1980s,30 although there were
certainly a few cases that might be considered significant exceptions
to this general principle.31 Thus, by reading the early school prayer
decisions,32 the early aid cases,33 and several Free Exercise cases,34 one
can see the Court explicitly or implicitly grappling with the question
of majoritarianism in a religiously diverse society within a system
where government action is pervasive.35 Separationism was the
mechanism the Court used to navigate religious pluralism under the
Establishment Clause, and accommodationism was the mechanism
under the Free Exercise Clause.36
There were exceptions to this trend, to be sure—most notably the
Sunday closing cases under the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause, and Zorach v. Clauson, which involved a
released-time program in the New York City public schools.37 But

28. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
29. Id. at 638.
30. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
31. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing law under the
Establishment Clause); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing law
under the Free Exercise Clause); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding releasedtime program, despite seeming violation of the ruling in Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948) only four years earlier).
32. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
33. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McCollum, 333 U.S. 203; Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
34. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
35. See, e.g., McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216–17 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (addressing
questions of religious diversity and religious pluralism). See also RAVITCH, supra note 4
(addressing questions of religious diversity and religious pluralism).
36. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 72–105.
37. See generally Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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Zorach, and particularly Justice Douglas’s role in writing for the
majority, may be explainable by the era in which it was decided, that
is, at the height of McCartheyism.38 The Sunday closing cases would
seem to be inconsistent with the broad ideals of earlier cases such as
Barnette and later cases granting exemptions to generally applicable
laws under the Free Exercise Clause, such as Sherbert v. Verner and
39
40
Wisconsin v. Yoder. For example, Braunfeld v. Brown, which dealt
with Sunday closing laws under the Free Exercise Clause, was
consistent with decisions in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
which countenanced laws written with the intent to force religious
minorities to accept the dominant values of society.41
Of course, this is not to say that these exceptions to the general
rule were inherently right or wrong as interpretations of the religion
clauses. Rather, they were glaring exceptions to the general focus on
protecting religious outsiders from a government often controlled by
more dominant religions and conceptions of religion. They represent
reasoning that would later become more prevalent.42
The question of minority rights versus majority will, or rights,
depending on how one views it, was out in the open in many of the
43
early cases. The famous school prayer cases, Engel v. Vitale and
School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, provide great
44
examples. In those cases, the debate between the majority and
concurring opinions and Justice Stewart’s dissenting opinions is

38. See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82
VA. L. REV. 1, 61 (1996) (“At least part of the explanation for this dramatic tilt toward
separationism [after Zorach] lies, I think, in the relative demise of domestic anti-communism
during the interval between Zorach and Engel.”). Cf. Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of
Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 83, 105 (1983) (asserting that Justice Douglas’
opinion in Zorach “may have been an oddity, reflecting political ambition or some other
personal impulse”).
39. See generally Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
40. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
41. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878). See also Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State
Constitutional Prohibitions Against Polygamy are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise
Clause, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 691, 710–20 (2001) (noting anti-Mormon bias underlying cases
like Reynolds); Elijah L. Milne, Blaine Amendments and Polygamy Laws: The Constitutionality
of Anti-Polygamy Laws Targeting Religion, 28 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 257 (2005) (examining
anti-Mormon bias evident in cases like Reynolds).
42. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human
Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
43. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
44. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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fascinating.45 The majority and concurring opinions focused on the
effect of school prayer on those who opposed it, while Justice Stewart
focused on the free exercise concerns of the more dominant group
46
who wanted it. Yet, in Braunfeld, the Sunday closing case decided
under the Free Exercise Clause, it was Justice Stewart who argued
that to deny an exemption to Saturday Sabbatarians was to favor the
dominant religious culture to the disadvantage of religious
minorities.47 Although the majority argued that upholding the Sunday
closing law might have the effect of harming religious minorities, that
48
was not its purpose. These debates demonstrate the possibility that
concerns over minority rights might come to the fore under one
religion clause, but the rights of more dominant religions may hold
sway under the other, and the possibility that some justices might
view the concerns of religious minorities more strictly under one
clause than the other.
Reading the cases from Barnette through the 1970s, one is struck
both with the consistency of explicit or implicit rights concerns and
the tendency toward what was often a reasonable pragmatic
resolution of these concerns (excluding the Sunday closing cases)
justified by questionable historical or neutrality based arguments.49
This disjunction between some of the major concerns the Court
addressed through the doctrine of separationism in the Establishment
Clause context and accommodationism in the Free Exercise Clause
context, and the justification for those doctrines, has led to a great
deal of criticism.50 More importantly, it has allowed a fundamental
shift in the consideration of rights under the religion clauses. After all,
if earlier Courts openly relied primarily on history and neutrality to
justify separationism, what was to keep a later Court from disputing
that history and altering the concept of neutrality to promote a very

45. Compare Engel, 370 U.S. at 421–36, and id. at 437–34 (Douglas, J., concurring), and
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203–30 (1963), and id. at 230–304 (Brennan, J., concurring), and id. at 305–08
(Goldberg, J., concurring), with Engel, 370 U.S. at 444–50 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308–20 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
46. Compare Engel, 370 U.S. at 421–36, and id. at 437–44 (Douglas, J., concurring), and
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 203–30 (1963), and id. at 230–304 (Brennan, J., concurring), and id. at 305–
08 (Goldberg, J., concurring), with Engel, 370 U.S. at 444–50 (Stewart, J., dissenting), and
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308–20 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
47. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 616 (1961) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 603–07.
49. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 2–6, 13–21, 84–86, 101–03, 165–66.
50. Id. at 2–12, 72–105.
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different concept of religious rights and religious freedom?51 Enter
the Rehnquist Court.52
II. FORMAL NEUTRALITY
The shift towards formal neutrality under the religion clauses did
not occur all at once. The seeds that sprouted into the current
dominant role of formal neutrality in the aid context were planted in
a few decisions in the 1980s. These decisions were viewed by many at
53
the time (and today) as inconsistent with earlier precedent. The area
where formal neutrality, aided by free speech doctrine, has most
consistently taken hold since the 1980s is the question of equal access
to government facilities by religious groups on the same terms as
other private entities.54 Before long, similar analysis was applied to
exemptions to generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise
55
Clause, and in the context of government aid to private individuals,
where a wide range of secular and religious entities were available for
which the aid could be used.56 Moreover, girded by free speech
analysis, formal neutrality was applied to private religious speech on
57
government property. Still, in the area of school prayer and other
religious content in the public schools, formal neutrality has not taken
58
hold. Additionally, formal neutrality has not dominated analysis of
government displays of religious symbols,59 although a focus on the
“traditions” of the nation has become more dominant in such cases, as
examined below in Part III.

51. Id. at 2–6, 13–36.
52. Of course, the later portion of the Burger era also reflected this shift, although not to
the same degree and across the wide array of issues later seen during the Rehnquist Court.
53. See generally Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388
(1983).
54. Examples of equal access cases involving public or limited public forums on
government property include Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001), Lamb’s
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993), and Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981).
55. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
56. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of
Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
57. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
58. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992).
59. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that the
county’s religious purpose behind displaying a series of Ten Commandment exhibits violated
the Establishment Clause); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (plurality opinion) (relying
on “tradition” approach to uphold Ten Commandments monument on the state capitol
grounds); id. at 698–705 (Breyer, J., concurring) (relying, in part, on the same).
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For those who are not familiar with the concept of “formal
neutrality,” it generally refers to a formalistic analysis of government
action vis-a-vis religion, which tends to stress the facial neutrality of
government actions, even where the real world effects of those actions
overwhelmingly benefit or harm religious interests.60 Thus, in the
government aid context, formal neutrality focuses on the facial
neutrality of an aid program and the existence of private choice
(which is itself determined in a formalistic way).61 In the Free Exercise
Clause exemption context, the focus is on laws of “general
applicability” regardless of the impact that those laws have on
religious practices.62 This is aided by a strict dichotomy between
religious belief, which is absolutely privileged, and religious practice,
63
which is subject to generally applicable laws.
The impact that formal neutrality has had on the rights calculus
under the religion clauses, especially in the free exercise and funding
areas, has been significant. When combined with the use of the
traditionalism approach, formal neutrality has ushered in an era, in
which the earlier concern about religious outgroups has been turned
on its head. At least as a de facto matter, the doctrine greatly favors
those from dominant and socially recognized religious traditions (or
64
potentially nonreligious traditions). The religious “haves,” who are
generally considered in the creation of relevant legislation and who
are demographically better situated to take advantage of the newly
opened funding forums, are in a much better position than the
religious “have nots,” who, as Justice Scalia has recognized, are left to
the whims of the legislative process.65 For example, compare Justice
Jackson’s passage from West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette explaining that the Bill of Rights’ purpose was to “withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy”66 to the
following quotation from Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in
67
Employment Division v. Smith, a case involving exemptions to
“generally applicable” laws under the Free Exercise Clause:68

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Ravitch, supra note 10, at 498–523.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652 (2002).
Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
Id. at 876–80.
See Ravitch, supra note 10.
See infra notes 67, 68, 69 and accompanying text.
319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872.
Id.
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It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political
process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a
system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the
69
centrality of all religious beliefs.

The doctrine of formal neutrality all but erases any focus on the
effects of government action.70 Of course, if one is concerned about
protecting the rights of religious individuals and groups in a pluralistic
society, including religious minorities and nonbelievers, as the earlier
decisions seemed to be, it is natural to balance interests and focus on
the effects of government action.71 The mechanism of facial neutrality
72
and “private choice” in the funding context, and the mechanism of
the “general applicability” of laws and the belief–practice dichotomy
in the free exercise context73 work to promote a contextual formalism
that can overwhelm any check on even the most serious skewing of
74
aid and rights toward dominant religious entities and beliefs. Of
course, in the context of exemptions to generally applicable laws
under the Free Exercise Clause, a number of cases after Sherbert and
Yoder, but before the open use of formal neutrality as the main
doctrinal approach, limited the effect of the balancing approach set
69. Id. at 890.
70. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 698–707 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting); see
Ravitch, supra note 10, at 513–23.
71. Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First Amendment: The History, the
Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 267 (2003) (“Under the Establishment
Clause, religious minorities would welcome a stronger focus on the effects of governmental
actions, whether under the guise of a reinvigorated Lemon effects prong or under some other
appellation.”).
72. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
73. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. at 895–96. The term “belief–practice dichotomy”
as used in this Essay refers to the distinction drawn by courts between religious beliefs, which
are privileged, and religious practices which are subject to generally applicable laws regardless
of the impact those laws have on the practice. Id. at 876–80. Numerous legal and theology
scholars have pointed out the problems with using this artificial distinction in determining free
exercise rights. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PLEASE DON’T WISH ME A MERRY
CHRISTMAS: A CRITICAL HISTORY OF THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 248, 49
(1997) (arguing this dichotomy reflects a Protestant bias); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1114–15 (1990) (“The conclusion
that the clause protects conduct as well as speech or belief would seem to follow from its very
words: ‘exercise’ means conduct. The point . . . is important because the Supreme Court
originally held the opposite.”). The reality is that for many practice-oriented religions the line
between belief and practice is an artificial, unrealistic, or nonexistent one. NAOMI W. COHEN,
JEWS IN CHRISTIAN AMERICA: THE PURSUIT OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 94–99 (1992).
74. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 13–36.
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forth in Sherbert.75 While the Sherbert–Yoder approach to freeexercise exemptions may have never lived up to its potential for
protecting religious freedom, especially for those whose religious
practices are outside dominant religious perceptions, the potential for
such protection remained in the test. The Court’s current formalneutrality approach, however, removes even the potential for robust
free exercise rights.
Under the Establishment Clause, the move away from a focus on
the effects of state action means that only the most obvious
religiously motivated behavior can be checked in contexts where
formal neutrality has been applied. Even then, some current justices
would eschew reliance on the motivation of government actors as
76
well. With the departure of Justice O’Connor from the Court, it is
possible that formal neutrality, and/or traditionalism, may come to
dominate even cases where the government seems to be clearly
endorsing or supporting religion. In the Free Exercise Clause context,
the use of formal neutrality has basically entrenched in doctrine the
Court’s failure to address the questionable presumptions about
religion that underlie the belief–practice dichotomy—assumptions
that suggest a questionable distinction between religious belief and
religious practice.77 By their very nature, formalistic tests do not

75. In the post-Yoder federal context, the reality was that the Court continually narrowed
the range of cases where exemptions could be mandated. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery
Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (denying request to protect sacred Native-American
ritual sites from a government project); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350–53
(1987) (declaring that a Muslim prisoner can be prevented from attending religious services at
prison when on work detail outside prison, even if prisoner has no choice but to be on work
detail); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 509–10 (1986) (deeming acceptable the
requirement that Orthodox Jewish military psychologist be required to remove a yarmulke in
indoor military settings despite serious religious objections); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712
(1986) (denying Native Americans’ request that their daughter not have a social security
number, despite serious religious concerns); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)
(requiring Amish employer to pay social security tax despite religious objection).
76. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 902–03 (2005), (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“I have urged that Lemon’s purpose prong be abandoned, because . . . even an
exclusive purpose to foster or assist religious practice is not necessarily invalidating. But today’s
extension makes things even worse. By shifting the focus of Lemon’s purpose prong from the
search for a genuine, secular motivation to the hunt for a predominantly religious purpose, the
Court converts what has in the past been a fairly limited inquiry into a rigorous review of the
full record. Those responsible for the adoption of the Religion Clauses would surely regard it as
a bitter irony that the religious values they designed those Clauses to protect have now become
so distasteful to this Court that if they constitute anything more than a subordinate motive for
government action they will invalidate it.”).
77. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 876–80 (delineating between privileged religious beliefs and
religious practices which are governed by “valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability”).
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respond well to shifting contexts,78 and in a nation with thousands of
religious traditions and a massive regulatory state, context controls
everything.79
So, what specific effects has the shift toward formal neutrality had
on rights and rights discourse under the religion clauses? First, it is
now clear that no matter how overwhelming the benefits to religious
entities, even to specific religious entities, so long as there is private
choice and facial neutrality, such benefits are acceptable even if used
to proselytize.80 Moreover, when addressing private choice, the
existence of actual choice—at least within the private entities
81
available—is essentially irrelevant. It may soon be the case that the
rights of the religious providers to access a funding forum outweigh
82
the impact such “choices” may have on religious outsiders.
Second, in the equal-access context, it is already clear that the
rights of religious groups, including groups representing dominant
religious traditions, outweigh the rights of those who are concerned
83
about proselytizing on government property. In the latter context,
there is serious analysis of the existence of a public forum and serious
concern about discrimination against religious individuals and entities
only where religious groups are excluded.84 Inherent in the equal
access cases is a balancing between the rights of people of less
dominant faiths or no faith at all and those of the faith seeking access
to the forum. The recognition of the rights of the latter group does not
affect the rights of the former in the same way that formal neutrality
does in the aid and free exercise contexts.85 Of course, even in the
78. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 13–36.
79. Id. at 20, 51, 157.
80. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).
81. See Ravitch, supra note 10, at 513–23.
82. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional
Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 152 (2003); Sarah Waszmer, Note, Taking it out of Neutral:
The Application of Locke’s Substantial Interest Test to the School Voucher Debate, 62 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1271, 1281–82 (2005); Ian Bartrum, Note, Paradise Lost: Good News, Charitable
Choice, and the State of Religious Freedom, 27 VT. L. REV. 177, 215 (2002).
83. Compare Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–08 (holding that a
public school violated a Christian club’s free speech rights by preventing it from using school
space for an after hours meeting), with id. at 130–34 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and id. at 134–45
(Souter, J., dissenting).
84. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395–97 (1993)
(declaring unconstitutional a public school district’s refusal to allow film series screening,
because the sole reason for the denial was the religious content of the programming); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (averring that by denying religious groups access to facilities, a
state university fundamentally violated the Constitution).
85. Ravitch, supra note 10, at 526–31.
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equal-access context, the mechanism of formal neutrality may be illequipped to deal with those situations where dominant religious
entities are favored or endorsed in the public forum.86
Finally, in the free-exercise context, exemptions to generally
applicable laws are not mandated even when accommodation would
be simple and state action affects fundamental religious practices.87
The interests of religious individuals whose faith includes religious
practices are legally subservient to the broader society’s interest in
the general applicability of laws.88 Any redress instead must come
89
from the political process.
None of this is to say that the results in any of these cases are
inherently right or wrong, or that the use of formal neutrality in the
equal access context, where free speech concerns are inextricably
90
connected to religion clause issues, is inappropriate. Rather, the
question here is how the focus on formal neutrality reconceptualizes
rights under the religion clauses. When used along with the
traditionalism approach discussed below in Part III, formal neutrality
often subordinates the rights of religious minorities and nonbelievers
to those of dominant religions under the religion clauses.91 This is the
exact opposite of the rights concepts used by earlier courts.
Compare, for example, the analyses in State of Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education92 and Lemon v. Kurtzman,93 with that
of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.94 In McCollum, a case involving a
released-time program in Champaign, Illinois,95 Justice Frankfurter,
concurring on behalf of himself and Justices Jackson, Rutledge, and
Burton, summed up the concerns of most of the decisions between
1940 and the late 1970s:
86. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 130–34 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 134–45 (Souter,
J., dissenting).
87. David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A Critical
Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241, 309–10 (1995).
88. See Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990)
(proclaiming constitutional a law that negatively impacts a religious practice but is applied
neutrally).
89. Id. at 890.
90. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 190 (suggesting that the equal access cases were correctly
decided primarily because of free speech concerns and concerns about placing religion at a
disadvantage in social discourse).
91. Id. at 13–36, 75–76; Feldman, supra note 71, at 273.
92. 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
93. 403 U.S. 602, 622–23 (1971).
94. 536 U.S. 639, 662–63 (2002).
95. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 222–31 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

03__RAVITCH_FINAL.DOC

2008]

7/23/2008 9:33:31 AM

RIGHTS AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES

105

The non-sectarian or secular public school was the means of
reconciling freedom in general with religious freedom . . . .
Designed to serve as perhaps the most powerful agency for
promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people,
the public school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement
in the strife of sects. The preservation of the community from
divisive conflicts, of Government from irreconcilable pressures by
religious groups, of religion from censorship and coercion however
subtly exercised, requires strict confinement of the State to
instruction other than religious, leaving to the individual’s church
and home, indoctrination in the faith of his choice.
. . . . [T]he growth of the secular school encountered the resistance
of feeling strongly engaged against it. But the inevitability of such
attempts is the very reason for Constitutional provisions primarily
concerned with the protection of minority groups. And such sects
are shifting groups, varying from time to time, and place to place,
thus representing in their totality the common interest of the
96
nation.

Similarly, in Lemon, a case involving government aid to religious
schools,97 Justice Burger, writing for the majority, addressed
divisiveness and religious conflict in the context of entanglement and
in a manner that seemed to focus heavily on the real effects of
government aid where “relatively few” sects benefit:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even
partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic
system of government, but political division along religious lines
was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment
was intended to protect. The potential divisiveness of such conflict
is a threat to the normal political process.
. . . . [I]n Walz we dealt with a status under state tax laws for the
benefit of all religious groups. Here we are confronted with
successive and very likely permanent annual appropriations that
benefit relatively few religious groups. Political fragmentation and
98
divisiveness on religious lines are thus likely to be intensified.

Separationism was the mechanism used to address these concerns
about religious pluralism and divisiveness in the early decisions, but as
Noah Feldman has recognized, the decisions were a product of their
96. Id. at 216–17.
97. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606–11.
98. Id. at 622–23 (internal citation omitted).
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times and an increasing focus on equality concerns.99 I assert that
these concerns about religious pluralism, the rights of religious
individuals and groups, and religious divisiveness in the political
process were the underlying force behind the Court’s approach until
the latter part of the 1980s. Moreover, a balancing approach had
emerged, which focused on the real world implications of government
activity. This approach enabled the Court to address the highly
contextual dynamics raised by such concerns. Even without
separationism, the Court would have found a way to address these
concerns, but separationism and the illusion of historical certainty
provided the Court with a ready mechanism to protect these
interests.100
Despite the seemingly obvious focus on divisiveness in earlier
decisions, the Rehnquist Court later excluded focus on religious
divisiveness from analysis in aid cases.101 Compare the previous two
quotations and that of Justice Jackson above with the following
excerpt from Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion in Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, commonly referred to as the “school voucher” case:
The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply
does not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a
particular time, most private schools are run by religious
organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a
religious school. As we said in Mueller, “[s]uch an approach would
scarcely provide the certainty that this field stands in need of, nor
can we perceive principled standards by which such statistical
102
evidence might be evaluated.”

Regarding divisiveness Justice Rehnquist, responding to Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion, wrote:
Justice Breyer would raise the invisible specters of “divisiveness”
and “religious strife” to find the program unconstitutional. It is
unclear exactly what sort of principle Justice Breyer has in mind,
considering that the program has ignited no “divisiveness” or
“strife” other than this litigation. Nor is it clear where Justice

99. See generally NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE
PROBLEM—AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2005); Noah
Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 673 (2002).
100. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 2–6, 72–86.
101. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662 n.7 (2002); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203, 233–34 (1997).
102. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 658.
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Breyer would locate this presumed authority to deprive Cleveland
residents of a program that they have chosen but that we
subjectively find “divisive.” We quite rightly have rejected the
claim that some speculative potential for divisiveness bears on the
103
constitutionality of educational aid programs . . . .

What is amazing about this analysis, in light of the concerns of
earlier courts, is that the voucher program in Zelman resulted in 96.6
percent of voucher students attending religious private schools
representing only one or two sects, and that the voucher amounts
were likely to continue to exclude private secular schools and other
religious schools.104 Moreover, virtually all secular choices were public
under the Court’s analysis and, thus, the result seems to suggest that
the Court will consider public options as choices even where virtually
all funding goes to private entities, or even where all funding going to
105
private entities goes to one sect within a community. Whether this is
good or bad analysis under the Establishment Clause, it certainly is
not neutral,106 nor does it address the pluralism concerns of earlier
107
courts in any serious way. The one saving grace of Rehnquist’s
analysis is that it considers the plight of some religious families who
were frequently excluded from the calculus under earlier decisions.108
However, the focus on formalism and ultimately the political process
does not suggest that such consideration motivates the formalneutrality approach. To the extent it does, it would now seem that
such individuals and families—who were often artificially excluded
under the old approach—may be the beneficiaries of significant
government largesse to the exclusion of religious minorities and
nonbelievers who might utilize the private options to better their
temporal lives, but only at the risk of their eternal futures.109

103. Id. at 662 n.7.
104. Id. at 698–707 (Souter, J., dissenting).
105. See Ravitch, supra note 10, at 518–19.
106. Id. at 513–23.
107. See supra notes 28–36, 89–100 and accompanying text.
108. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 72–73. Cf. Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism:
A Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.J. 433, 442 (1995)
(“[M]aintaining church/state separation or religious liberty requires treating religion quite
differently from other activities, a result inconsistent with equal treatment . . . . [S]eparationist
efforts to shelter [government] from religious influence . . . are bound to push religion into a
smaller and smaller corner of public life, violating both religious liberty and the equal status of
religion with other ideas.”).
109. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 13–36, 72–73.
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All of this demonstrates a fundamental change within the broader
shift toward an equality focus that has occurred over the last hundred
years or so.110 That shift is from a focus on individual and group rights
based on the real effect of government action to a focus on a
formalistic approach that takes little account of the real world impact
of government programs and activities, even where they significantly
111
favor one or two sects in a given community. In the end, the formalneutrality approach leaves such concerns to the political process, the
very process earlier courts were concerned might cause divisiveness
and promote the will of dominant religions over less politically
powerful religions.112
III. TRADITION

113

The “tradition” argument has been used along with, and
sometimes instead of, neutrality arguments.114 Yet the tradition
approach is problematic for a number of reasons, the most
fundamental of which will be discussed here. The approach uses
selected excerpts from historical patterns, and frequently gets even
those wrong. For example, when the Court used the “traditions”
approach to uphold a nativity scene displayed in a park by the city of
Pawtucket, Rhode Island, it relied in part on the religious heritage
and traditions of our nation.115 Yet there is no long-standing history of
displaying nativity scenes on public property, even as part of larger
Christmas displays. In fact, given the anti-Catholicism that was
rampant throughout most of our “historical traditions,” one would
hardly expect to find such a practice.116 Anti-Catholicism, antiMormonism, and anti-Semitism were longstanding “traditions” in our
117
nation, and most broad-based government recognition of religion
110. See generally FELDMAN, supra note 99 (discussing the broader shift from a focus on
liberty of conscience to equality concerns); Feldman, supra note 99 (stating that the main aim of
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence is to ensure equal protection for religious
minorities).
111. See Ravitch, supra note 60, at 513–23.
112. See supra Parts I and II.
113. Parts of this section have been adapted from RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 75–76.
114. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (allowing the display of monument inscribed
with the Ten Commandments in part due to the strong religious traditions of the United States);
id. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
115. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984).
116. HAMBURGER, supra note 22, at 201–19 (addressing the role of anti-Catholicism in
separationist history).
117. See generally id. (providing a history of anti-Catholicism in the United States);
HAROLD E. QUINLEY & CHARLES Y. GLOCK, ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA (The Free Press
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would have hardly included these groups—at least not in a positive
way—yet the Court certainly does not give these traditions weight.
One would hardly expect the Court to allow a small Protestantdominated town to include a display demeaning the “Bishop of
Rome” as part of its celebration of a religious holiday on the ground
that it is part of our nation’s longstanding tradition of antiCatholicism.
The point is that handpicking historical traditions to support an
argument suffers a flaw that even hard-originalism does not. Under
originalism, there is no reason to presume those traditions are binding
as society changes, although perhaps they may be one relevant factor
to consider (“hard-originalism” presumes the intent of the Framers
should be binding). Moreover, many unsavory traditions could be or
have been used by the Court in similar ways, such as the tradition of
segregation,118 harsh corporal punishment in the schools,119 and gender
120
inequality. These traditions are products of their time and place and
have changed over time.121 The Court uses the religious traditions
argument based on statements of various political figures throughout
United States history, but ignores the many contrary statements made
by historical figures and the historical and sociological data that
suggest these statements either had a different cultural meaning at
different times or were not in synch with the every day activities of
most citizens.122 Therefore one finds a dual problem of misinterpreting
1979) (discussing anti-Semitism); Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State
Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 121 (2001) (discussing “societal attitudes toward Roman
Catholicism”); Michael N. Dobkowski, American Anti-Semitism: A Reinterpretation, 29 AM. Q.
166 (1977) (discussing anti-Semitism); Milne, supra note 41, at 263–71 (discussing early antiMormon sentiment and the legislative attacks on Mormon polygamy); Sealing, supra note 41, at
710–20 (emphasizing the anti-Mormon nature of nineteenth century polygamy cases).
118. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (declaring constitutional a state
regulation mandating the racial segregation of railway cars).
119. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659–65 (1977) (upholding corporal
punishment in public schools in part because of its long tradition).
120. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“[T]he
civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective
spheres and destinies of man and woman . . . The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which
belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life.”).
121. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (invalidating legislation which gave “a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other”); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 (1954) (prohibiting racial segregation in public schools).
122. See Steven K. Green, Federalism and the Establishment Clause: A Reassessment, 38
CREIGHTON L. REV. 761, 796 (2005) (“The framers used terms and phrases familiar to the late
eighteenth century, and frequently employed rhetoric that was intentionally vague or
duplicitious [sic] . . . . Therefore, the precise meanings of recorded statements may be
ambiguous at best.”); Steven K. Green, Of Misnomers and Misinformation, FED. LAW. Sept.,
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traditions and selectively applying them outside their cultural and
historical context.
Moreover, the overarching question is whether such traditions are
123
even a valid basis for interpretation. I have elsewhere questioned
the use of hard-originalism in the religion clause context given the
conflicting historical accounts, but although sometimes used in
tandem with originalism, tradition arguments may be even more
problematic to legitimate because they lack the originalist self
justification that the intent of the framers should be binding.124 To say,
as the tradition approach does, that the practices and/or intent of
society should be binding simply begs the question: Which society,
current, past, or some combination of both, is the appropriate
125
indicator. Moreover, traditionalism presumes that a clear meaning
can be gleaned from past traditions that may have had very different
meanings and may have served different functions in their time.126
Even if one were to focus on the broad religious heritage of the
nation rather than the specific tradition in question127—an odd
approach given that some specific traditions, such as displaying
nativity scenes, may conflict with broad aspects of the allegedly

1999, at 38, 38 (“The originalist approach elevates the significance of isolated statements—
usually taken out of context and laden with 18th century terminology and biases—over the more
general themes and aspirations of the period and subsequent developments in understandings
and attitudes toward constitutional rights.”). See generally Derek H. Davis & Matthew
McMearty, America’s “Forsaken Roots”: The Use and Abuse of Founders’ Quotations, 47 J.
CHURCH & ST. 449 (2005) (correcting certain misinterpretations concerning the founders'
religious views).
123. See JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 60–63 (Harvard University Press 1980)
(noting that the “moral climate” of an age is difficult to ascertain and is so often invoked as to
be rendered meaningless). See generally Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and
Fundamental Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 101 (2002) (arguing that fundamental rights should
not be determined by analyzing whether traditionally that right has been protected).
124. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 2–6, 75–76.
125. Timothy L. Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil Communion, and the
Establishment Clause, 79 IOWA L. REV. 35, 50–51 (1993) (“The relative youth of these major
symbols of American civil religion suggests that the Court cannot simply nod its head to the
tradition of civic religiosity and expect that what is old and familiar will practice quiet and
sedentary ways. Civil religion continues to experience the same regular revivals as traditional
religion. Revival calls upon the faithful to demonstrate that a present faith is not simply the
token of a religious past, but a life-changing reality of today.”); Michele Hyndman, Tradition Is
Not Law: Advocating a Single Determinative Test for Establishment Clause Cases, 31 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 101, 123 (2005) (“The tradition argument is unworkable because it does not
define what constitutes a tradition. It relies on the subjectivity of judges, and it does not account
for changes in society.”).
126. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 75–76.
127. Hall, supra note 125.
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unified national religious heritage128—one would have to somehow
demonstrate just what this unified national religious tradition is. In
other words, even at the broadest levels, gleaning a national religious
tradition divorced from the often unsavory customs to which these
broader traditions were often connected seems a self-defeating task.129
Moreover, even if one were to miraculously divine a coherent set of
religious traditions from our national history, such traditions would
have had different meaning when embedded in their eras130 and may
have little connection to today’s society. Ironically, the simple act of
applying such supposedly unified traditions to today’s society may
undermine the very reasons such traditions were prevalent earlier.131
Of course, when the question of rights is raised, the tradition
approach would seem to have a ready answer: the dominant views of
religion in society win unless the dominant perspective has
traditionally chosen not to favor itself. This is, of course, a
fundamental shift from the concerns of earlier Courts,132 and, in fact,
embraces the position of the few justices who dissented from this
earlier line of reasoning.133 The tradition approach shifts the focus
away from religious divisiveness, the earlier Courts’ notion of
religious pluralism, and relies on a sense of religious community and
tradition that does not resonate with those excluded from such
134
community and tradition. When combined with formal neutrality,
the tradition approach completes a fundamental shift under the
religion clauses from a focus on effects, diversity, divisiveness, and
individual rights, to one that favors the demographically dominant,
minimizes the real effects of government action, and creates a unitary
religious heritage that never existed.
CONCLUSION
Over the last sixty years, we have witnessed the birth of a religion
clause doctrine that was heavily influenced by concerns over religious
pluralism, divisiveness, and the role of religious minorities and
128. RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 75–76.
129. Id. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 125.
132. See supra notes 8–13 and Part I.
133. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 444–45 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333
U.S. 203, 238–39 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
134. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text; RAVITCH, supra note 4, at 75–76.
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nonbelievers in our society. We have also witnessed the virtual death
of that doctrine at the hands of formal neutrality and traditionalism.
This shift in the conceptualization of rights under the religion clauses
has led from a doctrine concerned about religious outgroups and
nonbelievers to one where such concerns are, at best, an afterthought.
Some areas, such as public school prayer, curricular decisions, and
religious symbolism, still seem to focus on the rights of religious
minorities and nonbelievers. But even in these areas, changes on the
Court and a renewed focus on traditionalism may come to dominate.
The irony is that, by relying on the dual illusions of historical truth
and neutrality, the earlier Courts set the stage for later courts to undo
substantive protections by simply challenging or altering the historical
or neutrality-based analysis. By failing to rely directly on the rights
principles with which it seemed concerned, the earlier Court set the
stage for the destruction of those rights through the use of a very
different conception of history and neutrality—a conception that is
even more questionable than the earlier one, but which now
dominates jurisprudence under the religion clauses.

